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Constitutional Law-Religious Schools, Public Policy, and the
Constitution: Bob Jones University v. United States
May the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) revoke the tax-exempt status of a
private religious school that practices racial discrimination? Must it? Resolu-
tion of these two questions requires more than an interpretation of the Internal
Revenue Code (IRC). 1 The first question requires that the school's freedom of
religion, as protected by the first amendment,2 be weighed against the govern-
ment's interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education.3 The second
question requires balancing conflicting constitutionally protected rights: free-
dom of religion and equal protection, as guaranteed by the fifth and four-
teenth amendments. 4
The Supreme Court had both questions before it in Bob Jones University
v. United States.5 Unfortunately, in concluding that neither religious school
involved was entitled to tax-exempt status, the Court virtually ignored the con-
stitutional questions in the case. Instead of resolving these issues, the Court
based its decision on a strained construction of sections 170 and 501(c)(3) 6 of
the IRC, and required as a prerequisite to receiving tax-exempt status that an
otherwise tax-exempt organization meet common-law concepts of charity by
serving a "public purpose.' 7 While such a construction is arguably correct, it
runs contrary to a literal reading of the sections and leaves Congress free to
amend those sections to restore tax-exempt status to schools practicing racial
segregation. Because the Court failed to settle the important constitutional
questions in this case, it is unknown whether an amendment that restores tax-
exempt status would be unconstitutional. Furthermore, the Court's decision
leaves unresolved the constitutional rights of applicants denied admission to a
religious school because of their race.
In giving short shrift to petitioners' argument that by revoking its tax-
exempt status the IRS had violated petitioners' first amendment right to free-
dom of religion, the Court did recognize that the government may burden
1. I.R.C. §§ 1-9042 (1982).
2. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof. ... U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3. See infra notes 52-103 and accompanying text.
4. The fifth amendment provides that "[n]o person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law." U.S. CONsT. amend. V § I. The fourteenth amendment
provides that "[n]o state shall. . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the law." Id amend. XIV § 1. See infra notes 104-41.
5. 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983).
6. I.R.C. § 170(a) (1982) allows deductions for charitable contributions. Section
170(c)(2)(B) defines the term "charitable contribution" to include contributions or gifts to a corpo-
ration "organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educa-
tional purposes .... " Id § 170(c)(2)(B). Section 501(c)(3) exempts the following organizations
from taxation: "Corporations . . . organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable,
scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or inter-
national amateur sports competition . . . or for the prevention of cruelty to children or ani-
mals. . . ." Id § 501(c)(3).
7. Bob Jones, 103 S. Ct. at 2026.
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"religious liberty [if] ... it is essential to accomplish an overriding govern-
mental interest." The Court, however, did not consider the effect of this
"burden" on the religious schools involved, nor did it expressly weigh that
effect against the government's interest in eliminating racial segregation.
Moreover, the Court did not reach the equal protection issue of whether
granting tax-exempt status to schools practicing racial discrimination (in def-
erence to their first amendment rights) may constitute impermissible "state
action," violating minority students' rights to equal protection under the fifth
and fourteenth amendments. Because this issue was squarely before the
Court, and because it involved an irreconcilable conflict between two constitu-
tionally protected interests, it is unfortunate that the Court did not resolve it.
Instead of grafting a public policy requirement onto section 501(c)(3), the
Court either could have held for petitioners and called for Congress to make
known its intent concerning tax exemptions for such schools, 9 or perhaps
found that the government is constitutionally prohibited from providing assist-
ance to any school that discriminates-not because petitioners violated com-
mon-law concepts of charity, but because such government aid is
impermissible state action. This note focuses primarily on the constitutional
question left unresolved by the Court.
The controversy in Bob Jones consisted of two separate suits; Bob Jones
University v. United States'0 and Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc. v. United
States." The Court heard the cases together because they presented the same
issue: whether "nonprofit private schools that prescribe and enforce racially
discriminatory admissions standards on the basis of religious doctrine qualify
as tax-exempt organizations under 501(c)(3)."' 2
Bob Jones University is a nonprofit corporation "dedicated to the teach-
ing and propagation of its fundamentalist Christian religious beliefs."1 3 "It is
both a religious and educational institution."1 4 Because the university's lead-
ers believe that interracial dating and marriage are forbidden by the Bible,
blacks were denied admission until 1971.15 In May 1975 the university per-
mitted blacks to enroll but continued to prohibit interracial dating and
marriage.' 6
8. Id at 2035.
9. The IRS arrived at its interpretation by finding that a strong public policy exists against
discrimination, not by promulgating regulations necessary to enforce the IRC as written by
Congress.
10. 468 F. Supp. 890 (D.S.C. 1978), rev'd, 639 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1981), a 'd, 103 S. Ct. 2017
(1983).
11. 436 F. Supp. 1314 (E.D.N.C. 1977), af'd mem., 644 F.2d 879 (4th Cir. 1981), a'd sub
nom. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983).
12. Bob Jones, 103 S. Ct. at 2021.
13. Id at 2022.
14. Id
15. Id
16. The University maintains the following rule:
There is to be no interracial dating
I. Students who are partners in an interracial marriage will be expelled. ...
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The IRS subsequently revoked the university's tax-exempt status pursu-
ant to its new policy that it could "no longer legally justify allowing tax-ex-
empt status to private schools which practice racial discrimination." 17 The
university brought suit to have its tax-exempt status restored.'1 The federal
district court in South Carolina held that the IRS had violated the university's
right to religious freedom,19 and had exceeded the authority delegated by
Congress.20 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the
district court's "simplistic reading" of section 501(c)(3) "tears section 501(c)(3)
from its roots."'2' Reasoning that the government's interest in eliminating ra-
cial discrimination in education is compelling, the court also held that the uni-
versity's freedom of religion was not unconstitutionally burdened.22 Finally,
the court found that the IRS had not exceeded its delegated authority; rather,
the IRS merely was making regulations necessary to perform its statutory du-
ties.23 Dissenting, Judge Widener declared that the university's freedom of
religion rights were at least equal, if not paramount, to the government's inter-
est in eradicating discrimination.24 In rejecting the IRS's interpretation, he
stated that Congress "did not grant [tax] exemptions by reference to the law of
charitable trusts." 25
Goldsboro Christian School is also a nonprofit religious school. Since its
inception the school has admitted few minority students, believing that
"[c]ultural or biological mixing of the races is. . . a violation of God's com-
3. Students who date outside their own race will be expelled.
4. Students who espouse, promote, or encourage others to violate the University's dat-
ing rules and regulations will be expelled.
Id at 2023.
17. Internal Revenue Service, News Release (July 10, 1970) quoted in Bob Jones, 103 S. Ct. at
2021. The Service formalized its policy in Rev. Rul. 447, 1971-2 C.B. 230:
Both the courts and the Internal Revenue Service have long recognized that the statutory
requirement of being "organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable...
or educational purposes" was intended to express the basic common law concept [of
charity] .... All charitable trusts, educational or otherwise, are subject to the require-
ment that the purpose of the trust may not be illegal or contrary to public policy.
Id at 230.
Noting the "national policy to discourage racial discrimination in education," id at 230-31,
the IRS found that "a [private] school not having a racially non-discriminatory policy as to stu-
dents is not 'charitable.'" Id. at 231.
The IRS also found that it could not "treat gifts to such schools as charitable deductions for
income tax purposes" under § 170. Internal Revenue Service, News Release (July 10, 1970),
quoted in Bob Jones, 103 S. Ct. at 2021.
18. Bob Jones University first paid $21 in unemployment taxes for one employee. After the
IRS refused a refund, the University brought suit, claiming a right to the refund because its tax-
exempt status was unconstitutionally revoked. Bob Jones, 103 S. Ct. at 2023.
19. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 468 F. Supp. 890, 907 (D.S.C. 1978), rev'd, 639
F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1980), a'd, 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983).
20. Id at 906-07.
21. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 639 F.2d 147, 151 (4th Cir. 1980), a "d, 103 S. Ct. 2017
(1983).
22. See id at 153-55.
23. Id at 152.
24. See id at 159 (Widener, J., dissenting).
25. Id at 158 (Widener, J., dissenting).
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mand."'26 The school never had been granted tax-exempt status, and filed suit
seeking such status after the IRS attempted to collect federal social security
and unemployment taxes.27
A federal district court in North Carolina granted a summary judgment
for the IRS, finding that section 501(c)(3) must be read as prohibiting tax-
exemptions to educational organizations that practice racial discrimination.28
Rejecting Goldsboro's claim that such an interpretation violates its right to
religious freedom, the court found that the government had a compelling in-
terest in eradicating racial discrimination.2 9 The Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals affirmed per curiam, citing its recent decision in Bob Jones as
controlling.30
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the Court of Appeals by an
eight to one majority and agreed that "entitlement to tax exemption depends
on meeting certain common law standards of charity-namely, that an institu-
tion seeking tax-exempt status must serve a public purpose and not be con-
trary to established public policy. '31 The majority reasoned that such a
construction is mandated if section 501(c)(3) is "analyzed and construed
within the framework of the Internal Revenue Code and against the back-
ground of. . . Congressional purposes."' 32 While recognizing that the denial
of tax-exempt status to an otherwise exempt organization presents "serious
implications for the institution affected,"'33 the Court nevertheless upheld the
IRS's actions because "racial discrimination in education violates" a most fun-
damental public policy.34 Furthermore, the Supreme Court ruled that the IRS
did not overstep its lawful bounds by issuing interpretive rulings: "[I]t would
be anomalous for the Executive, Legislative and Judicial Branches to. . . [de-
clare] a firm public policy on racial discrimination, and at the same time have
the IRS blissfully ignore what all three branches of the Federal Government
had declared."'35
The Court upheld the IRS's actions even though petitioners' racial dis-
cimination was based on sincere religious beliefs.36 The government's interest
in eradicating racial discrimination in education was found both "compelling"
and "overriding."3 7 Furthermore, the denial of tax-exempt status was held
26. Bob Jones, 103 S. Ct. at 2024 n.6.
27. Id at 2024. Goldsboro first paid $3,460 in withholding, social security, and unemploy-
ment taxes. When a refund was denied, Goldsboro brought suit, claiming a right to the refund
because tax-exempt status had been unconstitutionally denied. Id
28. Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc. v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 1314, 1319 (E.D.N.C.
1977), af'dmem., 644 F.2d. 879 (4th Cir. 1981), af'd sub nom. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States,
103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983).
29. Id. at 1318.
30. Bob Jones, 103 S. Ct. at 2025.
31. Id at 2026.
32. Id
33. Id at 2029.
34. Id
35. Id at 2032.
36. Id at 2022, 2024.
37. Id at 2035. "[Riacially discriminatory schools 'exer[t] a pervasive influence on the entire
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not to violate the establishment clause because it was based on a "neutral,
secular basis."'3 8 Although the equal protection argument was before the
Court, it was not decided "[i]n light of [the] resolution of this case."'39
Justice Powell filed a separate concurring opinion. He agreed with the
majority that "tax-exempt status under §§ 170(c) and 501(c)(3) is not available
to private schools that concededly are racially discriminatory," 40 but not be-
cause all organizations must serve public policy as a prerequisite to tax-exempt
status. Rather, tax exemptions are justified because "'each group contributes
to the diversity of association, viewpoint, and enterprise essential to a vigor-
ous, pluralistic society.' "41 He would have denied petitioner's tax-exempt sta-
tus beause he agreed that "[Congress has determined that the policy against
racial discrimination in education should override the countervailing interest
in permitting unorthodox private behavior. ' 42 Such a determination, how-
ever, was not for the IRS to make.
Justice Rehnquist in dissent offered a literal interpretation of section
501(c)(3). 4 3 He noted that petitioners "are organized for 'educational pur-
poses' within the meaning of 501(c)(3)," and stated that, absent an amendment
by Congress, "the IRS is without authority to deny" petitioners' tax-exempt
status.44
To understand the import of the Court's holding in Bob Jones one must
also appreciate the tax law that the Court's decision alters. Briefly, any organi-
zation that falls within one of the eight categories found in section 501(c)(3) 45
is exempt from taxation, and any "charitable contribution" made to such an
organization is deductible under section 170(a).46 The general rule has been
that the IRS can deny such an exemption or deduction if to do otherwise
would frustrate "sharply defined national or state policies" 47 "that are evi-
denced by some governmental declaration." 48 Presumably the legislative dec-
process,' outweighing any public benefit that they might otherwise provide." Id at 2035 n.29
(quoting Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 469 (1973)).
38. Id at 2035 n.30. (quoting Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 452 (1971)).
39. Id at 2032 n.24.
40. Id at 2037 (Powell, J., concurring in part).
41. Id, at 2038 (quoting Walz v. Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 689 (1970) (Brennan, J.,
concurring)).
42. Id at 2038-39. See also id at 2037 n.l.
43. Id at 2039-40 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Rehnquist believed that only Congress, not the
IRS, "could deny tax-exempt status to educational institutions that promote racial discrinmina-
tion," and that Congress had "simply... failed to take this action." Id According to Rehnquist,
the majority's attempts at statutory construction "quite adeptly avoids the statute it is construing."
Id at 2040. "The IRS is empowered to adopt regulations for the enforcement of these specified
requirements. . . but Congress has left it to neither the IRS nor the courts to select or add to the
requirements . I..." d. at 2042.
44. Id at 2045.
45. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1982). See supra note 6.
46. I.R.C. § 170(a) (1982).
47. Commissioner v. Henninger, 320 U.S. 467, 473 (1943); see also Tank Truck Rentals, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958) (plaintiff could not deduct intentionally incurred overweight-
truck fines as cost of doing business).
48. Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 90, 97 (1943). See also Commissioner v. Tellier, 383
U.S. 687 (1966) (litigation expenses incurred in unsuccessful defense of illegal business expenses
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laration must be in the form of specific legislation. 49 By declaring that an
organization must serve a "public purpose" as a prerequisite to receiving tax-
exempt status, the Court in Bob Jones has modified section 501(c)(3), and
charged the IRS with the responsibility for deciding which organizations serve
a "public purpose."5 0 Even if the IRS interpretation of section 501(c)(3) is
valid for nonreligious, private schools, the Court had to decide if it could
"constitutionally be applied to schools that engage in racial discrimination on
the basis of sincerely held religious beliefs. 5 1
The government is prohibited by the free exercise clause from imposing
unreasonable burdens on the practice of religions,5 2 and by the establishment
clause from favoring one religion over another.5 3 In applying the free exercise
clause, the Court has distinguished between religious beliefs and actions in
pursuit of those beliefs; the former is protected absolutely, whereas the latter
receives less protection.5 4 The government cannot prohibit religious schools
from teaching a certain belief,55 but it may restrict actions stemming from that
belief if the government's interest is compelling enough and if the restriction is
the least burdensome means available to achieve the desired goal. Some con-
fusion exists, however, concerning how great the government's interest must
be.
In 1878 the Court upheld the conviction of a polygamist who claimed that
his Mormon belief in polygamy was protected by the first amendment.5 6 Rec-
ognizing the distinction between religious beliefs and action flowing from
those beliefs, the Court held that the government may restrict religious con-
duct that is "in violation of social duties or subversive of good order."5' 7 Simi-
held deductible; constitutional right to defend oneself); Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27
(1958) (amounts spent to lease premises and hire employees for operation of illegal gambling
business held deductible absent contrary congressional declaration).
49. See Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30,34 n.6 (1958) ("Because state
policy in this case was evidenced by specific legislation, it is unnecessary to decide whether the
requisite 'governmental declaration' might exist other than in an Act of the Legislature.").
50. Such an exercise of discretionary power traditionally has been the reserve of Congress,
not the IRS. Justice Powell's concurring opinion is correct in declaring that the Court essentially
has given the IRS "authority to decide which public policies are sufficiently 'fundamental' to
require denial of tax exemptions." Bob Jones, 103 S. Ct. at 2039 (Powell, J., concurring in part).
The IRS's "business is to administer laws designed to produce revenue for the Government, not to
promote 'public policy.'" Id For a more in-depth analysis of how the Court's decision alters tax
aw, see Note, Federal Taxation-Bob Jones University v. United States: Segregated Sectarian
Education and IRC Section 501(c)(3), 62 N.C.L. REv. 1038 (1984).
51. Bob Jones, 103 S. Ct. at 2034.
52. See infra notes 54-78 and accompanying text.
53. See infra notes 84-97 and accompanying text.
54. This distinction has its roots in a letter by Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptist
Association in which he stated that "the legislative powers of the government reach actions only,
and not opinions." See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878). Applying this doctine,
the Court in Reynolds declared that "[1]aws are made for the government of actions, and while
they cannot interfere with mere religious belief, . . . they may with practice." Id. at 166.
55. See, e.g., Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (government may not compel affirma-
tions of a belief repugnant to a religious belief); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953)
(government may not discriminate against people because they hold religious views abhorrent to
the authorities).
56. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
57. Id at 164.
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larly, the Court upheld a state statute making it a crime for a minor to sell
literature in public places, even though defendant's religious beliefs mandated
such action.58 In each case the Court found the state's interest important
enough to justify imposing criminal sanctions for conduct flowing from reli-
gious beliefs.
In 1961 the Supreme Court evaluated the constitutionality of an indirect
economic burden on religion in Braunfeld v. Brown.59 Orthodox Jews sued to
enjoin enforcement of a state criminal statute forbidding retail sales on Sun-
days. Plaintiffs argued that because their religion forbids working on Satur-
days, the statute would force them either to violate a basic tenet of their
religion and keep their shops open on Saturdays, or to suffer serious economic
losses. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Warren held that the burden
placed on plaintiffs' freedom of religion was outweighed by the state's secular
goal of maintaining peace and quiet one day a week.60 The burden was not
prohibitively heavy-the statute did not make Orthodox Judaism unlawful,
just its practice more expensive.6' Furthermore, he wrote that states must use
the least burdensome means when restricting religious practices in pursuit of
secular goals.62
Justice Brennan concurred in part and dissented in part in Braunfeld. His
opinion provides the basis for much of the Court's subsequent analysis of free
exercise cases. He declared that a state needs more than a rational basis for
adopting legislation that burdens religious conduct; freedom of religion may
be restricted "'only to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which
the State may lawfully protect.' "63
A situation somewhat similar to that in Braunfeld arose in Sherbert v. Ver-
ner,64 in which a Seventh Day Adventist was discharged by her employer be-
cause she would not work on Saturdays, her sabbath. She was unable to find
another job for the same reason, and was denied unemployment compensation
because she did not demonstrate good cause for declining employment when
offered. 65 Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan agreed that the state had
abridged her free exercise rights. Rejecting the view that "a rational relation-
ship to some colorable state interest would suffice," 66 he held that " '[o]nly the
gravest abuses, endangering a paramount interest, give occasion for permissi-
ble limitation.' ",67 He distinguished Braunfeld by finding a stronger state in-
terest in that case.68 Perhaps a key distinction is that the "administrative
58. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
59. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
60. Id at 607.
61. Id at 605.
62. Id at 607.
63. Id at 612. (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting in part) (quoting West Va. State Bd.
of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943)).
64. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
65. Id at 400-01.
66. Id at 406.
67. Id (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
68. Id at 408.
1984] 1057
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
problem" in accommodating the Orthodox Jews in Braunfeld would have been
greater than that required in Sherbert.69 Regardless of whether Braunfeld and
Sherbert can be distinguished logically, two important elements of the balanc-
ing test had emerged: the government must show that a burden on religious
conduct is necessary to prevent grave abuses of a paramount interest, and that
lesser means to achieve the government's interest do not exist.
Nine years later Chief Justice Burger added to this balancing test by con-
sidering whether enforcing the state interest in compulsory education would
violate "basic religious tenets and practice[s]."' 70 In Wisconsin v. Yoder Amish
parents were convicted of violating Wisconsin's compulsory school-attendance
law. The law required attendance until age sixteen, but the Amish believed
that attendance in public schools past the eighth grade would "endanger their
salvation."71 While noting that Wisconsin could compel school attendance if
a "state interest of sufficient magnitude" outweighed otherwise protected reli-
gious rights,72 Burger found that the Amish interests were paramount; "com-
pulsory school attendance to age 16 . . .carries with it a very real threat of
undermining the Amish community and religious practice as they exist today;
they must either abandon belief and be assimilated into society at large, or be
forced to migrate to some . . . more tolerant region."' 73 Central to the deci-
sion was the Amish educational alternative-a type of hands-on apprentice-
ship, inculcating Amish values. "Weighing the minimal difference between
what the State would require and what the Amish already accept, it was in-
cumbent on the State to show with more particularity how its admittedly
strong interest in compulsory education would be adversely affected by grant-
ing an exemption to the Amish."'74 The practical effect of Yoder was that an
otherwise compelling government interest may be outweighed if enforcing that
interest would threaten a basic tenet of the religion in qustion while only mini-
mally enhancing governmental goals.
The Court in recent years, however, has been much more willing to find
government interests compelling, regardless of how basic the conduct is to the
religion. This development probably stems from a reluctance to determine
whether a religion's beliefs are sincere, and whether the legislation will change
the religion.75 The effect of this approach is to consider only one side of the
69. Id at 408-09. The "administrative problem" in Braunfeld would have required exempt-
ing all Orthodox Jewish shopkeepers from closing on Sundays. The "administrative problem" in
Sherbert would have required granting unemployment compensation to all Seventh-Day Advent-
ists who could not find work because they could not work on Saturdays.
70. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 218 (1972).
71. Id at 209. "[H]igh school attendance with teachers who are not. . .Amish. . .inter-
poses a serious barrier to the integration of the Amish child into the Amish religious community
.... [I]t tends to develop values they reject as influences that alienate man from God." Id at
211-12.
72. Id at 214.
73. Id at 218.
74. Id at 235-36.
75. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982) (it is not up to the government to
determine "the proper interpretation of the Amish faith"); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employ-
ment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981) ("Courts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation.").
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balancing test: the importance of the government's interest, not in relation to
religious interests, but to the goals of the government. For example, Amish
employers sued the government in United States v. Lee76 for refund of social
security taxes paid. The Amish contended that the payment of social security
taxes and the receipt of such benefits violated their religious belief that failing
to provide for one's own elderly and needy is sinful. Writing for a unanimous
Court, Chief Justice Burger held that "[b]ecause the broad public interest in
maintaining a sound. . . [social security] system is of such a high order, reli-
gious belief in conflict with the payment of taxes affords no basis for resisting
such taxes."' 77 The Court did not consider whether the taring requirement
would force the Amish to violate a "basic religious tenet," but the Court did
note that no less burdensome means existed to achieve the important govern-
ment interest involved.78
If one examines the Bob Jones case in light of the principles enunciated
by the Court in the foregoing free exercise cases, the result seems correct. The
most obvious effect of the IRS ruling upheld by the Court in this case is that
nonprofit religious schools that practice racial discrimination, either in their
admissions policies or otherwise, now will find the exercise of their beliefs
more expensive. In some cases the expense may be prohibitive. Not only will
such schools have to pay taxes, but they will also lose a major source of their
revenues-fewer people will make contributions if those contributions are not
deductible.79
Despite the sizeable burden placed on petitioners' free exercise of reli-
gion, the government's interest in eradicating racial discrimination outweighs
the school's interests. The government's interest is more than a matter of im-
portant public policy, it is of constitutional proportions,80 and certainly quali-
fies as compelling under the recently relaxed compelling interest test.8 I The
goal of eradicating discrimination "is dominant over other constitutional inter-
ests to the extent that there is complete and unavoidable conffict."8 2 Chief
76. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
77. Id at 260.
78. Id See Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981)
(the "state may justify an inroad on religious liberty by showing that it is the least restrictive
means of achieving some compelling. . . intererst"); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 628 (1978)
(" [O]nly those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance
claims to the free exercise of religion.' ") (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972)).
Lee, Thomas, and McDaniel stand for the proposition that whenever the state interest is necessary
for the government to achieve important goals, religious freedoms may be burdened regardless of
how central the practice is to the religion.
79. The IRS not only denied tax exemptions to all private schools that discriminated on the
basis of race, but also denied charitable deductions for contributions to such schools. Internal
Revenue Service, News Release (July 10, 1970), quoted in Bob Jones, 103 S. Ct. at 2021. See supra
note 17 and accompanying text. This issue was not litigated in Bob Jones because a reversal by
the Court of the IRS's denial of tax-exempt status would necessarily entail an allowance for chari-
table deductions-both were denied by the IRS because the religious schools did not meet the
IRS's standards of charity. Bob Jones, 103 S. Ct. 2021 nn.l&2.
80. See infra note 124 and accompanying text.
81. See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
82. Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1167 (D.D.C.), a'dmem, sub noam. Coit v. Green,
404 U.S. 997 (1971).
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Justice Burger did not consider whether the revocation of tax-exempt status
would force petitioners to violate a basic tenet of their religion. This very issue
was of vital importance to the Chief Justice in Wisconsin v. Yoder.83 The anal-
ogy is imperfect, however, because in Yoder a reasonable alternative existed to
the mandatory school-attendance law, making the government interest less
compelling. No reasonable alternative exists here, and revocation of petition-
ers' tax-exempt status is the least burdensome means available to further the
goal of a desegregated school system.
The second freedom of religion question presented is whether the denial
of tax-exempt status to religious schools violates the establishment clause.
While this particular question is one of first impression, the Court has evalu-
ated the affirmative grant of financial assistance to religious schools in light of
the establishment clause. 84 In so doing the Court has developed a three part
test: the grant must (1) have a neutral, secular purpose;85 (2) neither advance
nor inhibit religion;86 and (3) avoid "excessive government entanglement with
religion. ''87
The Court has recognized the protection of educational diversity as a
valid secular purpose.88 Thus, a state program that provides materials or
money to all students in the state would be upheld. A textbook loan program
was upheld in Board of Education v. Allen8 9 because the purpose of the pro-
gram was the "furtherance of the educational opportunities for the young." 90
Furthermore, because the program gave the textbooks to the students, and not
to the individual schools to be used in their discretion, the program met the
requirement of neutrality.91
Even if a government action has a neutral, secular purpose, it must not
advance or inhibit religion. This part of the test is perhaps harder to apply
than the first because any action taken by the government towards a religious
school will tend to affect the school. The question is not whether the govern-
ment action affects the school, but whether it does so unreasonably. The Court
has held that this part of the test is not violated unless the government intended
to favor one religion over another. Writing for the majority in Walz v. Tax
Commission,92 Chief Justice Burger upheld tax exemptions for religious orga-
nizations against a claim that they violated the establishment clause. "The
legislative purpose is neither the advancement nor the inhibition of religion, it
is neither sponsorship nor hostility."93 Thus, the question whether a govern-
83. 406 U.S. 205, 218 (1972). See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
84. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664
(1970); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
85. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968).
86. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 15 (1947).
87. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 674, 664 (1970).
88. Id at 687-89 (Brennan, J., concurring).
89. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
90. Id at 243.
91. Id at 242.
92. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
93. Id at 672.
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mental action favors one religion over another is more concerned with the
government's intent than with the practical effect on a particular religion.
The final part of the test is that the government may not become "exces-
sively entangled" with religion. As the Court noted in Lemon v. Kurtzman,94
"Judicial caveats against entanglement must recognize that the line of separa-
tion between the government and religion is a blurred, indistinct, and variable
barrier depending on all the circumstances of a particular relationship.
95
Pertinent areas of examination are "the character and purposes of the institu-
tions ... benefitted, the nature of the aid. . and the resulting relationship
between the government and the religious authority." 96 Applying the above
test, the Court in Lemon found unconstitutional two state statutes that author-
ized reimbursement of expenditures made by religious schools for textbooks
and teachers' salaries. Enforcement of the statutes would have required con-
stant state surveillance to ensure that the teachers were teaching only secular
subjects. In essence, the Court held that a "'program. . . whose very nature
is apt to entangle the state in details of administration'" will be found to "ex-
cessively entangle" the government in religion.9
7
According to the Court's three-part test, the revocation of the university's
tax-exempt status does not violate the establishment clause. Although religious
schools that do not discriminate may now be favored over those that do, the
test is not whether the effect of the government's action is to inhibit or advance
religion, but whether the government intends to do so.98 The Court's goal-
the eradication of discrimination in education-has a neutral, secular basis.99
Furthermore, although the government will become more entangled with reli-
gious schools by taxing the ones that discriminate, the entanglement probably
will not be excessive. "The test is inescapably one of degree."' 00 While the
Court has previously noted that it is preferable to grant tax exemptions to
religious institutions than to tax them,' 0 ' it is unlikely that this would be
enough of a difference to constitute excessive entanglement. Churches pres-
ently are taxed on unrelated business income, yet this is not considered exces-
sively entangling.'0 2 An increased degree of taxing is minimally intrusive,
especially given the significance of the government's interest. Moreover, "'the
uniform application of the rule to all religiously operated schools [that dis-
criminate] avoids the necessity for a potentially entangling inquiry into
whether. . . [the] practice. . . is the result of a sincere religious belief.'"103
94. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
95. Id at 615.
96. Id
97. Id (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 695 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
98. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
99. See Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968).
100. Walz, 397 U.S. at 674.
101. Id at 675.
102. See generally Simon, The Tax-Exempt Status of Racially Dircriminatory Religious
Schools, 36 TAx L. REv. 477, 512-13 (1980-81).
103. Bob Jones, 103 S. Ct. at 2035 n.30 (quoting Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 639 F.2d
147, 155 (4th Cir. 1980) (emphasis in original)).
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Quite apart from the freedom of religion issues is the question whether
the denial of tax-exempt status is required by the equal protection provision of
the fifth amendment. Because of the constitutional conflict between the
school's right to freedom of religion and every student's right to equal protec-
tion, it is unfortunate that the Court did not decide the issue. 104 Analysis of the
conflict requires evaluating two intertwined questions: May a religious school
discriminate on the basis of race? Must the government deny tax-exempt sta-
tus to religious schools that practice racial discrimination?
Regarding the first question, the fourteenth amendment provides that
"[nbo State shall. . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the laws."' 05 Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866106 pro-
vides that "[a]ll persons shall have the same right . . . to make and enforce
contracts . . .and to the full and equal benefit of all laws . . . ." The
Supreme Court in Runyon v. McCrary0 7 held that section 1981 prohibits pri-
vate, commercially operated, nonreligious schools from maintaining a racially
discriminatory admissions policy. Section 1981 previously had been applied
to invalidate private discrimination in the sale of property, s0 8 in employ-
ment, 10 9 and in hospital services.1 10 By extending section 1981 to racial dis-
crimination in private education, the Court broke with the view that racial
discrimination in education could be prohibited only in cases involving state
action.' The Court in Runyon rejected the school's claim that its policies
were protected by the first amendment guarantee of freedom of association:
"[Ilt may be assumed that parents have a First Amendment right to send their
children to educational institutions that promote the belief that racial segrega-
tion is desirable. . . . [B]ut it does not follow that the practice of excluding
racial minorities from such institutions is . . .protected by the same princi-
ple."112 The decision did not reach the question whether section 1981 prohib-
its religious schools from practicing racial discrimination on the basis of
religious belief. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals considered this question
one year later in Brown v. Dade Christian Schools, Inc..113
104. But see United States v. Clark, 445 U.S. 23, 27 (1980) ("[T]his Court will not pass on the
constitutionality of an Act of Congress if a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which
the question may be avoided."). More is involved in Bob Jones, however, than a choice between
deciding the case on the basis of statutory construction or the constitutionality of an act of Con-
gress; this case involves a direct conflict between the first amendment and the fifth and fourteenth
amendments. See infra notes 120-24 and accompanying text.
105. U.S. CONsT. amend. XlV § 1.
106. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976).
107. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
108. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
109. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
110. United States v. Medical Soe'y of S.C., Inc., 298 F. Supp. 145 (D.S.C. 1969).
111. Prior to Runyon, the Court had declared segregation in public schools to be impermissi-
ble state action, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971), as well as the
loaning of textbooks for the benefit of students in racially discriminating private schools, Nor-
wood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
112. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 176. See also Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470 (1974)
('[P]rivate discrimination may be ... a form of. . .freedom of association protected by the First
Amendment, but it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections.").
113. 556 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978).
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The Dade Christian Schools suit was brought pursuant to section 1981 by
black parents who claimed that Dade had denied their children admission
solely because of their race. The school claimed that its members held a-reli-
gious belief forbidding interactions between whites and blacks that might pro-
mote interracial marriage-therefore, its admissions policy was protected by
the first amendment. Sitting en banc, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial
court's decision to enjoin Dade from denying admission to plaintiffs' children
because of their race. Five of the thirteen judges agreed with the trial court
that the school's racial practices were based on a social philosophy unpro-
tected by the first amendment, and not on a sincere religious belief. 1 4 The two
concurring judges reasoned that plaintiffs' claim outweighed the school's free-
dom of religion claim, even if the latter's belief was held sincerely." 5 The six
dissenting judges would have remanded the case so that the trial court could
weigh the two competing interests." 16
In deciding Bob Jones, the Supreme Court did not directly address the
question whether section 1981 absolutely prohibits religious schools from
practicing racial discrimination. The Court did note, however, that "[a]n un-
broken line of cases. . . establishes beyond doubt this Court's view that racial
discrimination in education violates a most fundamental national public pol-
icy, as well as rights of individuals."'1 17 The Court quoted Cooper v. Aaron 118
in noting that "'[the right of a student not to be segregated on racial grounds
in school. . . is indeed so fundamental and pervasive that it is embraced in
the concept of due process of law.' "19 By stopping short of holding that reli-
gious schools cannot practice racial discrimination, the Court left unresolved
the troubling issue whether a minority student's right to equal protection,
under either section 1981 or the due process clause of the fifth amendment,
outweighs a religious school's right to exercise a sincerely held religious belief
that the black and white races should not intermix. 120
Even assuming that the Court would not compel a religious school to
accept minority students in contravention of its own teachings, there remains
the question whether the state action doctrine prohibits the federal govern-
ment from granting tax-exempt status to religious schools that practice racial
discrimination. 12'
114. Id at 312-13.
115. Id at 314 (Brown, CJ., concurring); id. at 314 (Goldberg, J., specially concurring).
116. Id at 324 (Roney, J., dissenting).
117. Bob Jones, 103 S. Ct. at 2029.
118. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
119. Bob Jones, 103 S. Ct. at 2029 (quoting Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 19 (1958)).
120. The Court's decision does not compel petitioners to enroll blacks. Rather, it upholds the
IRS' denial of tax exemptions to petitioners if they do not enroll blacks. Such a result accords
with the Court's practice of burdening religious freedom in the least restrictive manner available
to achieve a compelling governmental interest.
121. See generally Note, State Action: Theories for Appoling Constitutional Restrictions to Pri-
vate Activity, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 656, 656-77 (1974) [hereinafter Note, State Action]; Note, Section
1981 After Runyon v. McCrary: The Free Exercise Right of Private Sectarian Schools to Deny
4dmission to Blacks on Account of Race, 1977 DUKE L.J. 1219, 1260-63. Note, First Amendment-
Free Exercise Clause-Conflict With 42 U.S.C § 1981, 9 N. KEN. L. REv. 381, 397-402 (1982).
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The thrust of the state action doctrine is that "'a state may not induce,
encourage or promote private persons to accomplish what [the state] is consti-
tutionally forbidden to accomplish.' 122 The doctrine applies to the federal
government as well as state governments because the fifth amendment re-
quires the federal government to follow the same equal protection standards
that govern state conduct under the fourteenth amendment.' 23 It is well set-
tled that a state may not support institutions that practice racial discrimina-
tion;124 therefore, the state action doctrine would seem to prohibit federal tax
exemptions to religious schools that discriminate on the basis of race. Two
questions remain: Is the grant of a tax exemption, as opposed to an affirmative
grant of money or materials, state action? Is intent to discriminate necessary
to show an equal protection violation, or is a racially disparate impact
sufficient?
The Supreme Court has never squarely decided whether the grant of a
federal tax exemption may constitute state action, ' 25 but in Norwood v. Harri-
son 1 26 the Court held that a state's grant of financial aid to a private school
practicing racial discrimination was impermissible state action. The Court in
Norwood held that "[a] State may not grant. . . tangible financial aid. . . if
that aid has a significant tendency to facilitate, reinforce, and support private
discrimination."' 27 Therefore, the question becomes whether a tax exemption
is "tangible financial aid."
Lower courts have held that the granting of tax exemptions and deduc-
tions constitutes impermissible government support of the racially discrimina-
tory policies of private parties. For instance, a federal district court in the
122. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 465 (1973) (quoting Lee v. Macon County Bd. of
Educ., 267 F. Supp. 458,475-76 (M.D. Ala.), afdsub nom. Wallace v. United States, 389 U.S. 215
(1967)).
123. See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127
(D.D.C.), appeal dismissed sub nom. Cannon v. Green, 398 U.S. 956 (1970).
124. See, e.g., Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 467 (1974) (the "State's constitutional obli-
gation requires it to steer clear. . . of giving significant aid to institutions that practice racial...
discrimination"); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 19 (1958) ("State support of segregated schools
through any arrangement ... cannot be squared" with its equal protection obligations). See also
Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
125. Although in Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 675 (1970), Chief Justice Burger stated
that "itihe grant of a tax exemption is not sponsorship since the government does not transfer part
of its revenues to churches but simply abstains from demanding that the church support the
states," he was not speaking of sponsorship in the context of the state action doctrine. Instead, he
was speaking of sponsorship in the context of the establishment clause's prohibition against exces-
sive government entanglement with religion. The grant of a tax exemption is less entangling than
the act of taxing a church.
Courts have held that a level of government support may pass muster under the establish-
ment clause, yet be impermissible state action in the context of the equal protection provision
implicit in the due process clause of the fifth amendment. See Writers Guild of Am., West, Inc. v.
FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064, 1135-36 (C.D. Cal. 1976) ("The degree of involvement required for a
showing of signocant state involvement is less when racial discrimination is involved."), vacated
on other grounds, 609 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980). See also Reitman
v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 375-76 (1967).
126. 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
127. Id at 466.
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District of Columbia held tax exemptions granted to fraternal organizations
that discriminated on the basis of race to be impermissible state action. 128 And
a federal district court in Wisconsin held that "a tax-exemption constitutes
affirmative, significant state action in an equal protection context where racial
discrimination fostered by the State is claimed."' 29 Similarly, commentators
generally agree that "the charitable exemption and deduction provisions...
are classified as tax expenditures because they reflect some degree of govern-
ment support of the underlying activities."'130
The argument that a tax exemption is not sufficient governmental support
to invoke the state action doctrine should fail on two counts. First, there is no
appreciable difference between the effect of a government grant and a tax ex-
emption. Tax exemptions differ "only in method from a disbursement of gov-
ernment funds."131 Indeed, the Court in Bob Jones recognized that "Congress
[implemented] tax benefits to charitable organizations . . . to encourage the
development of private institutions that serve a useful public purpose
.... 132 Second, in light of the compelling governmental interest in eradi-
cating racial discrimination in education, the courts have been particularly
ready to find any form of government support to such schools impermissible.
The better argument is that under the State action doctrine the grant of tax
exemptions to private schools that discriminate on the basis of race constitutes
support.
Proof of a discriminatory intent is generally necessary to invoke the state
action doctrine. The Court in Washington v. Davis 133 upheld a qualifying test
administered by a police department to applicants, even though a higher per-
centage of blacks failed the test than whites. Disproportionate racial impact
alone is not sufficient; 134 if "a statute designed to serve neutral ends is never-
theless invalid. .. [because] in practice it benefits or burdens one race more
than another, 'serious' and 'far-reaching' questions would be raised about a
wide range of public benefit and regulation statutes."' 35  Nevertheless,
"[d]isproportionate impact is not irrelevant."' 136 If there is "proof that a dis-
criminatory purpose has been a motivating factor" in the government's grant
of assistance, then the government has the burden of disproving race as a mo-
128. McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972).
129. Pitts v. Department of Revenue, 333 F. Supp. 662, 668 (E.D. Wis. 1971). See also
Falkenstein v. Department of Revenue, 350 F. Supp. 887, 889 (D. Or. 1972), appeal dismissed, 409
U.S. 1095 (1973).
130. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison
With Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REv. 705, 705 (1970). See also Note, State
Action, supra note 121, at 675 ("Tax exemptions and deductions provide an aid held to involve the
government in private activity.").
131. Reiling, Federal Taxation: What Is a Charitable Organization?, 4 A.B.A. J. 525, 595
(1958).
132. Bob Jones, 103 S. Ct. at 2026.
133. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
134. Id at 242. See also Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
266 n.15 (1977) ("In many instances, to recognize the limited probative value of disproportionate
impact is merely to acknowledge the 'heterogeneity' of the nation's population.").
135. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 n.14 (1967).
136. Id at 241.
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tive in its actions. 137 Moreover, discriminatory intent can be proved if the
government should have foreseen the likelihood of a disparate racial impact
resulting from its actions.138
In deciding Bob Jones, the Court did not discuss the state action doctrine,
but Justice Rehnquist stated in his dissenting opinion that, if it had, he would
have decided that the grant of a tax exemption to religious schools that prac-
tice racial discrimination is not impermissible state action. "The statute is
facially neutral; absent a showing of a discriminatory purpose, no equal pro-
tection violation is established."'139 Relnquist's statement, however, supplies
only half of the necessary analysis. A discriminatory purpose may be inferred
from a governmental act, if the government should have foreseen that a dispa-
rate racial impact would result. In Bob Jones the government could make no
claim that it could not have foreseen that a racially disparate impact would
result from its grant of a tax exemption-petitioners openly admit that they
practice racial discrimination. If such evidence is ever to prove "discrimina-
tory purpose," this case seems a logical one. This is not to say that the govern-
ment intended to discriminate in "any everyday sense of [the word] . . . but
that government funds should not be put to unconstitutional uses either by
government or private persons."' 40
In all probability, such tax exemptions constitute impermissible state ac-
tion. Government support of nonsectarian schools that practice racial discrim-
ination is unconstitutional. Furthermore, a religious school's tax exemption
serves the same governmental "support" function that an affirmative grant of
financial aid would serve. And a powerful argument can be mounted that a
foreseeable "disparate impact" would result from a grant of tax-exempt status
to a religious school openly advocating racial segregation. With so many fac-
tors weighing in favor of a state action ruling to the effect that Congress may
not constitutionally grant tax-exempt status to a religious school practicing ra-
cial discrimination, it is unfortunate that the Supreme Court chose to rest its
decision in Bob Jones on shaky, statutory construction grounds.' 4 The prob-
lem with the Court's holding is that judicial findings of congressional intent
are subject to subsequent legislation. It would have been desirable for the
Court to have resolved the state action issue to make clear the constitutional
duties of both the Congress and the IRS.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court has ended preferential tax treatment
for a group of institutions that violate a fundamental public policy-the
achievement of a nondiscriminatory educational system. The government's
action was found to be a reasonable burden on the schools' freedom of religion
because it was limited in scope to ending government support for religious
137. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 467 (1979).
138. Id at 464. See also Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 566-67 (1974); Nor-
wood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 466 (1973).
139. Bob Jones, 103 S. Ct. at 2045 n.4 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
140. Note, State Action, supra note 121, at 677.
141. See Bob Jones, 103 S. Ct. at 2032 n.24 (noting that the Court's statutory construction
holding rendered it unnecessary to decide the state action question).
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activity that violates a compelling state interest. In deciding the case on the
basis of a creative statutory construction, the Court left unresolved several
conflicts involving competing constitutional guarantees. In so doing the Court
has merely postponed resolution of these troubling constitutional questions.
PAUL R. MARR
